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UP IN THE AIR: THE CONFLICT
SURROUNDING THE EUROPEAN
UNION’S AVIATION DIRECTIVE AND
THE IMPLICATIONS OF A JUDICIAL
RESOLUTION
INTRODUCTION

W

ith a new regulatory program for aviation industry
emissions, the European Union has brought the tension
between trade and climate change efforts to a head. The European Union’s measure, the Aviation Directive (“Directive”), incorporates aviation into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
(“EU ETS”).1 Under the Directive, aircraft operators must purchase greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emission 2 allowances for any
flight that lands or takes off from an aerodrome3 in the EU.4
The EU incorporated aviation activities into the EU ETS
based on its concern that GHG emissions from aviation (“aviation emissions”) would frustrate emission reductions made in
other sectors.5 Aviation is a quickly growing industry, with 2.8
1. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“EU ETS”) is a
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system that covers GHG emissions from activities in the power and industry sectors. European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (Jan. 2013),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_2013_en.pdf.
The
Aviation Directive (“Directive”) is part of a 2008 amendment to the EU ETS
and came into effect on January 1, 2012. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, 2009
O.J. (L 8) (EU).
2. Aviation emissions consist of carbon dioxide (“CO2”), water vapor, nitrous oxide, sulfur oxide, hydrocarbons, and black carbon particles. Environmental Report 2010 – Aviation and Climate Change, INT’L CIVIL AVIATION
ORG.
[ICAO]
38
(2010),
http://www.icao.int/environmentalprotection/Documents/Publications/ENV_Report_2010.pdf [hereinafter ICAO
Environmental Report 2010]. The EU ETS regulates different greenhouse gas
emissions for different sectors; it regulates CO2 from commercial aviation and
energy-intensive production industries, nitrous oxide (“N2O”) from industries
that produce certain acids, and perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”) from the aluminum
industry. European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), supra note 1.
3. An aerodrome is any site at which a flight arrives or departs. Council
Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at annex 1.
4. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 3, 5, 17.
5. Id. at 10–11.
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billion passengers transported by air in 2011, a number that is
expected to increase to 5 billion passengers by 2030.6 Aviation
is also responsible for 35% of international trade by value,
transporting US$5.3 trillion in cargo annually. 7 While emissions from aviation currently contribute 2% of global carbon
dioxide (“CO2”) emissions, this figure is projected to increase
300-700% by 2050.8
In the face of failure within the International Civil Aviation
Organization (“ICAO”)—the international standard setting
body for aviation—to regulate aviation emissions, the EU implemented the Directive to incorporate these emissions into the
EU ETS.9 With the recognition that an EU-only program would
be ineffective to address the aviation industry’s overall impact
on climate change, the EU included the regulation of emissions
from non-EU airlines in the Directive for the complete length of
flights, including the portions that are not over EU territory.10
6. Thirty-seventh Session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice (SBSTA37), Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26–Dec. 1, 2012,
Agenda Item 11(d) Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and
maritime transport (Submission by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)), ¶ 1.1 (2012) [hereinafter SBSTA 37 Agenda Item 11(d)].
7. Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade – The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111, 122 (2012); SBSTA 37 Agenda
Item 11(d), supra note 6.
8. ICAO Environmental Report 2010, supra note 2, at 18. Non-CO2 emissions consist of “carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, water vapour, sulphate and
soot particles,” Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 19. CO2 emissions from aviation are released directly into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere. ICAO Environmental Report 2010, supra note 2, at 38–41. In
combination with non-CO2 GHG emissions, their effect may double or quadruple the impact of CO2 alone, exacerbating their contribution to global
warming. Id.
9. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9. The ICAO is a “specialized agency of the United Nations” that was established by the Chicago
Convention in 1944 to ensure the safety and development of international
civil aviation. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art.
43–44, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention]. The
members of the ICAO meet at least once every three years at the ICAO Assembly to set “legally binding standards,” “issue non-binding policy recommendations,” and establish other policy for the organization. See Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate Change, Case C-366/10, (2011) ¶ 11 (delivered Oct. 6, 2011) (not
yet reported) [hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Kokott]; ICAO, Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, § 1, ICAO Doc. 7600/7 (7th ed. 2012).
10. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 112–14.
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The Directive brings to the forefront the importance of the inclusion of aviation emissions in an international framework to
address climate change and reflects the EU’s prominent role in
pushing global climate change negotiations forward.11
Dissension to the Directive centers on the debate over the degree to which a country can unilaterally impose environmental
policies with extraterritorial effects.12 Several major economic
powers, such as the United States, India, and China, have
made their opposition to the Directive known through domestic
legislation, escalating the conflict. China provisionally barred
airlines from complying with the Directive, and suspended a
US$14 billion deal with a European commercial aircraft manufacturer. 13 Similarly, India directed domestic commercial aircraft carriers not to comply with the Directive.14 In November
2012, President Barack Obama signed the “European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act,” prohibiting U.S.
aircraft operators from participating in the EU ETS. 15 That
same month, following a meeting of the ICAO Council, the EU
agreed to temporarily “stop the clock” on the enforcement of the
Directive, conditioned on the realization of a global marketbased measure for aviation emissions at the 38th ICAO Assembly in 2013.16
11. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 4–6.
12. CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW (CISDL),
LEGAL ANALYSIS ON THE INCLUSION OF CIVIL AVIATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM 8 (Verki Michael Tunteng ed., 2012) [hereinafter
CISDL].
13. Anurag Kotoky, India Joins China in Boycott of EU Carbon Scheme,
(Mar.
22,
2012),
REUTERS
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USLNE82L02220120322; see J.A., China
and Europe’s Emission-Trading Scheme Not Free to Fly, ECONOMIST (Feb. 8,
2012),
www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/02/china-and-europesemission-trading-scheme.
14. Kotoky, supra note 13.
15. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011,
Pub. L. No. 112-200, 126 Stat. 1477 (2012);
Brian Beary, Obama Signs Anti-EU Emissions Trading Bill, EUROPOLITICS
(Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.europolitics.info/sectoral-policies/obama-signsanti-eu-emissions-trading-bill-art345643-15.html.
16. Commission Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of
the Council derogating temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading within the Community, at 4–5, COM (2012) 697
(Nov. 12, 2012) [hereinafter Commission Proposal on Derogation from EU
ETS]; Memorandum from the European Commission, Stopping the clock of
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If the EU reinstates the Directive following the 38th ICAO
Assembly, countries are likely to challenge the consistency of
the Directive with World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.17 Since aviation involves trade in cargo, the aggrieved parties would likely allege
that the Directive serves as an impediment to trade, in conflict
with the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (“GATT”), a
WTO agreement governing international trade in goods.18 This
conflict is reminiscent of the environmental dispute in U.S.–
Shrimp,19 where the Appellate Body held that unilateral environmental measures may be justified by the social and environmental exceptions contained within GATT Article XX. 20
ETS and aviation emissions following last week’s International Civil Aviation
Organisation (ICAO) Council, MEMO/12/854 (Nov. 12, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-854_en.htm.
17. NIGEL PURVIS & SAMUEL GRAUSZ, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE
UNITED STATES, AIR SUPREMACY – THE SURPRISINGLY IMPORTANT DOGFIGHT
OVER CLIMATE POLLUTION FROM INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 3 (2012). The WTO’s
Dispute Settlement Body was formed to resolve disputes between WTO
Members “concerning their rights and obligations” under the WTO agreements. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes art. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. If members cannot reach mutual agreement on the dispute, the complaining party
can request the establishment of a panel to examine the matter and make
recommendations, which are subject to appellate review by the WTO’s Appellate Body. Id. art. 1–19.
18. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, pmbl., art. III, ¶ 1
(Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994) [hereinafter GATT].
19. The report of a panel or the Appellate Body pertaining to a specific
dispute is only applicable to the parties to that dispute, and even if adopted
does not have binding precedential value. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Legal
effect of panel and appellate body reports and DSB recommendations and rulings: 7.2 Legal status of adopted/unadopted reports in other disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c7s2p1_e.
htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2013). However, the reasoning developed in these
reports pertaining to the interpretation of WTO rules may be persuasive in
subsequent cases. Id.
20. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp Products, ¶ 147, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). While the preamble
to the WTO agreement explicitly recognizes the need to “protect and preserve
the environment,” environmentalists have historically found international
trade rules to be a major obstacle to the implementation of environmental
policies, even coining the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(“GATT”) as “GATTzilla,” and characterizing the WTO as an organization
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However, the Directive does not fall within the protection of
Article XX because the re-routing of flights to evade full compliance with the measure, and the pass-through of compliance
costs into the price of goods, will result in a net increase in
GHG emissions.21 This will serve to undermine the relationship
between the EU’s rationale for the trade-restrictive effects of
the measure and its legitimate objective of GHG emission reductions.22 Failure of the Directive before the WTO will undercut the important role the EU plays as a driving force behind
climate change negotiations, with disastrous consequences for
the achievement of a global market-based measure for aviation
emissions, and a global climate regime as a whole.23
This Note argues that in light of these risks—the debilitation
of the EU’s critical role as a climate leader and the jeopardization of a global climate regime, generally—the EU should forestall the extra-territorial application of the Directive, even if
the 38th ICAO Assembly fails to make sufficient progress on a
market-based measure, so as to allow for a multi-lateral
agreement to be reached in the ICAO or another forum.24 Part I
provides background on the Directive and how it may be challenged under WTO rules. Part II examines how the Directive is
not justified under the exceptions of GATT Article XX, in light
of the reasoning in the U.S.–Shrimp decision. Part III discusses
that prioritizes trade liberalization at the cost of the environment. Id. pmbl.;
Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
739, 752 (2001). Alternatively, opponents to such environmental measures
argue that concessions for environmental policies will be used as a façade for
“increased trade protectionism of domestic industry,” and trigger “tit-for-tat
trade restrictions.” Meltzer, supra note 7, at 117; GARY C. HUFBAUER ET AL.,
GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 13 (2009). Hufbauer provides a hypothetical example of tit-for-tat trade restrictions: the United
States could enact performance standards or carbon taxes for certain imports
from a country such as India, arguing that Indian industries have high GHG
emissions. HUFBAUER ET AL., at 13. In response, India could “impose a duty
on all imports from the United States,” arguing that the United States’ average CO2 emissions are greater than the world average. Id.
21. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 140–45.
22. See Appellate Body, Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, ¶ 227, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
23. See Louise Van Schaik & Simon Schunz, Explaining EU Activism and
Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-Driven
Actor? 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 169, 179–82 (2012); PURVIS & GRAUSZ,
supra note 17, at 3.
24. See Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 183–84.
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the implications of this outcome for future efforts to combat
climate change and recommends that the EU continue to defer
the extraterritorial enforcement of its Directive until a multilateral environmental agreement is reached for aviation emissions.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Expansion of the EU ETS
The EU emerged as a driving force for international climate
policy during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“Convention” or “UNFCCC”).25 Under the Convention, the EU
committed to reduce its emissions by 8% of 1990 levels by
2012,26 a commitment it voluntarily revised in 2007 to 20% of
1990 levels by 2020.27 To assist in achieving its Kyoto commitments, and to contribute to the international goal of limiting
global temperature increases to 2° Celsius, the EU implemented its cap-and-trade scheme, the EU ETS.28 The EU ETS seeks
to reduce GHG emissions by capping the total volume of emissions from businesses in the energy-intensive industry and
power sectors at a certain level. 29 These large emitters are
then required to obtain “allowances” to cover each ton of CO2 or
CO2-equivalent they release within the capped emissions
amount.30
25. The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), that sets
binding targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Kyoto Protocol to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 2.2, Dec.
10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol].
26. Jos Delbeke, The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS): The Cornerstone of
the EU’s Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, 1 EUR. REV. OF ENERGY MKT.
1, 2 (2006); Sebastian Oberthür & Claire Roche Kelly, EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges, 43 THE INT’L
SPECTATOR 35, 36 (2008).
27. Delbeke, supra note 26, at 2; Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 26, at 36.
28. Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) art. 1, 5 (EU); Council
Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 3–5, 10–11.
29. Delbeke, supra note 26, at 2; Council Directive 2003/87/EC, supra note
28, at Annex 1; European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS), supra note 1.
30. European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading System
(EU ETS), supra note 1.
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Businesses can acquire allowances in several ways. First, the
government allocates a set number of free allowances, the proportion of which decreases the longer the EU ETS is in operation. 31 The remaining allowances are then auctioned, where
companies may buy additional allowances if needed to fully
cover their emissions or sell their surplus allowances.32 The EU
ETS requires companies to monitor and report their annual
GHG emissions to an accredited independent verifier.33 A company is sanctioned if its emissions exceed the number of allowances it holds.34 The EU reports that the EU ETS currently covers 45% of the total GHG emissions from the EU member
countries.35
In accordance with the system established under the EU
ETS, the Directive sets a cap on the permissible amount of aviation emissions. Airlines are then responsible for covering their
annual emissions with tradable allowances.36 The allocation of
allowances is divided into trading periods.37 During the 2012
trading period, emissions were capped at “97% of historical
aviation emissions.” 38 During the 2013 trading period,39 and in
subsequent trading periods subject to revision, emissions are
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(c).
37. Id. art. 3. National governments appoint companies to facilitate the
auction process, either opting to use a common platform or establishing their
own platforms for the auctioning of allowances, as Germany, Poland, and the
United Kingdom have done. European Commission Report on The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), supra note 1.
38. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(c). “Historical aviation emissions” are defined as “the mean average of the annual emissions in
the calendar years 2004, 2005, and 2006 from aircraft performing an aviation
activity listed in Annex I.” Id. art. 1.3(s). The Directive defines “aircraft operator” as, “the person who operates an aircraft at the time it performs an aviation activity listed in Annex I or, where that person is not known or is not
identified by the owner of the aircraft, the owner of the aircraft.” Id. art. 1,
3(b). Emissions are calculated by multiplying the fuel consumption of the
flight by an emission factor that is taken from the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (“IPCC”) guidelines. Id., Annex IV(b).
39. While the EU temporarily deferred enforcement of the Directive to
non-EU aircraft operators, as of November 2012, pending the 38th ICAO Assembly, the Directive still applies to intra-EU flights. Commission Proposal
on Derogation from EU ETS, supra note 16, at 4–5.
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capped at 95% of historical aviation emissions.40 While 15% of
allowances are distributed through the auction process, the
remaining allowances are granted to aircraft operators free of
charge. 41 Aircraft operators that do not comply with the Directive are subject to a penalty of roughly €100 per missing allowance, and are still responsible for coming up with the missing allowances. 42 If aircraft operators refuse to comply, they
may be subject to a ban from operating in the EU.43
There are three notable provisions of the Directive. First, to
address “carbon leakage” and competitiveness concerns, the EU
included non-EU airlines within the Directive and required airlines to obtain allowances for the full-length of flights landing
in or taking off from the EU, including the portion of the flight
outside of EU territory. 44 Carbon leakage occurs when businesses transfer production to countries with more lax environmental policies to evade the costs of complying with an environmental regulation,45 thereby diluting the effectiveness of the
measure’s objective to reduce carbon emissions.46 Competitiveness concerns arise when price increases as a result of increased environmental regulation lead foreign countries to substitute domestic goods for imported goods from the EU.47 In addition, if the Directive only applied to the part of the flight
within the EU, an aircraft operator may adjust his or her flight
plan to minimize the distance flown within the EU and evade
compliance with the Directive.48 This would result in an overall
increase in the length of the flight and the related GHG emissions. 49 If unaddressed, carbon leakage and competitiveness

40. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3.
41. Id. art. 3(d)(3).
42. ICAO, Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and its Impact, at 1.3, ICAO Doc. CWP/13790 (Oct. 17, 2011); Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art.
16.
43. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 26.
44. E.g., Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3; Meltzer, supra note 7, at 116–22.
45. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 16.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 116–22.
48. Id. at 140.
49. Id. at 145.
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issues would lead to a lack of net emissions reductions and
serve as a major disadvantage to domestic industry.50
Second, the Directive contains several exemptions under
which certain flights may be excluded from the regulatory
scheme.51 First, the Directive contains a conditional exemption
to allow for the optimal interaction between the Directive and
measures adopted in non-EU countries to address aviation
emissions.52 The conditional exemption provides for coordination between the two regulatory schemes, or exemption of the
non-EU country’s aviation emissions from the Directive.53 Second, the EU commits to mitigate or eliminate obstacles to accessibility or competitiveness issues that may arise under the
Directive.54 This commitment seeks to take into account countries that may be disproportionately disadvantaged by the operation of the Directive, such as countries dependent on tourism.55 Other activities excluded from the requirements of the
Directive include aircraft operators that fly a de minimus
number of flights per allowance period and flights relating to
military operations, scientific research, public service, training,
and the official duties of government officials.56
Third, to further contribute to the EU ETS’s objective to combat global climate change, the Directive pledges to allocate all
revenues from the auctioning of allowances to climate change
research, adaptation, and mitigation efforts in the EU and in
other countries.57 In addition, the EU expresses its intention
for the Directive to serve as a blueprint for emissions trading
schemes in other countries, which will ultimately link with the
EU ETS and serve as a stepping stone towards an international framework addressing aviation-related climate change activities.58

50. See Id. at 111–12, 116–18.
51. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 25.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. art. 30.
55. See id. art. 30. An example of a country dependent on tourism is Barbados, where tourism accounts for 59% of the country’s GDP. Lorand Bartels,
The WTO Legality of the Application of the EU’s Emission Trading System to
Aviation, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 429, 433 n.31 (2012).
56. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, Annex 1(b)–(c).
57. Id. at 22.
58. Id. at 5–6, 17.
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While the EU frames the Directive as a building block for an
international emissions trading scheme for aviation, its decision to regulate aviation emissions was made independent of
any international decision making body. Historically, international discussions on the regulation of aviation emissions have
been unfruitful. When the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol
failed to reach an agreement on how to address aviation emissions, future efforts to make GHG emissions reductions in this
area were relegated to the ICAO.59 The ICAO lists environmental protection as one of its strategic objectives, but by 2004 it
had made few developments on how to address aviation emissions and it appeared that an emissions trading system for aviation would not be pursued under the ICAO’s auspices.60 Dissatisfied with the slow progress of international negotiations,
in 2008 the EU enacted the Directive.61
The ICAO expressed strong opposition to the Directive in a
working paper that was supported by “26 of the 36 Member
States on the ICAO Council.”62 The ICAO denounced the EU’s
unilateral market-based system, holding the view that the Directive undermines the ICAO’s leadership in the field of international aviation and its ability to serve as a forum for effectively addressing aviation’s contribution to global climate

59. Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol states, “The Parties included in Annex
I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels,
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization respectively.” Kyoto Protocol, supra note
25, art. 2.2.
60. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9. In 2007, the ICAO
established a special group to create a climate change program within the
ICAO and has since endorsed the development of a market-based mechanism
for aviation emissions if achieved through mutual agreement between member states. ICAO, Assembly Resolution in Force (as of 28 September 2007),
app. K–L, ICAO Assembly Resolution A36-22 (2008); ICAO, Consolidated
statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental
protection – climate change, ¶¶ 13–18, ICAO Assemb. Res. A37-19 (2010),
compiled in Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly, at 55–63 (Provisional ed.,
Nov. 2010) [hereinafter ICAO Assemb. Res. A37-19]. The ICAO has yet to
produce binding commitments to aviation emission reductions. Kate Kulovesi, “Make your own special song, even if nobody else sings along”: International aviation emissions and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 2 CLIMATE L.
535, 541 (2011).
61. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 9.
62. CISDL, supra note 12, at 15.
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change.63 The ICAO asserted that the Directive is not an effective tool to address aviation’s contribution to climate change,
because it will instigate nations to develop competing marketbased schemes, creating a “chaotic” system with adverse effects
on efforts to reduce global emissions.64 In addition, the ICAO
expressed its concern that the EU’s unilateral measure will not
adequately consider the different conditions that exist in different countries, especially in developing nations.65 Indeed, the
airline industry’s opposition to the Directive became even more
apparent when U.S. airline carriers challenged the validity of
the Directive before the European Court of Justice, a decision
that addressed the ICAO’s role in regulating aviation emissions.66
B. Legal Challenges to the Directive
The international aviation community initiated the first legal
challenge to the Directive in the European Court of Justice.67
Airline industry leaders challenged the validity of the Directive, with a claim largely focused on the Directive’s inclusion
of transatlantic aviation.68 The case looked at the relationship
between EU law and international law, and the extent to which

63. Inclusion of International Civil Aviation in the EU ETS and its Impact,
supra note 42, at 4.2.
64. Id. at 3.2, 4.2.
65. Id. at 3.1.
66. CISDL, supra note 12, at 3.
67. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy & Climate
Change, Case C-366/10, (2011), ¶¶ 1–2 (delivered Dec. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
ATAA]. The Directive was challenged under the customary international law
principles of State sovereignty and freedom to fly over the high seas, as well
as the Chicago Convention, Open Skies Agreement, and Kyoto Protocol.
ATAA, ¶ 158.
68. Id. ¶¶ 42–45. The claimants included the Air Transport Association of
America (“ATAA”), a non-profit “trade and service organization,” and American Airlines, Continental Airlines, and United Airlines. Id. ¶¶ 2, 42. The International Air Transport Association and the National Airlines Council of
Canada intervened on the side of the claimants, while five environmental
organizations intervened on the side of the Defendant, including the Aviation
Environment Federation, the British World Wildlife Fund for Nature, the
European Federation for Transport and Environment, the Environmental
Defense Fund, and Earthjustice. Id. ¶ 44.
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the EU can unilaterally regulate aviation emissions in the absence of an international regulatory framework.69
The court found that the Directive is not a mandatory provision on conduct of non-EU countries over international territory, but that it merely takes into account extraterritorial activities that have a substantial effect on the EU’s environmental
interests.70 Focusing on the environmental protection objectives
of the Directive, the court found that commercial operators
must comply with EU law when they land or depart from an
aerodrome within the territory of the EU.71 The court’s interpretation thus characterizes the Directive as an internal rule
that has effects outside the EU, and not as a unilateral action.72
69. Sanja Bogojević, Legalising Environmental Leadership: A Comment on
the CJEU’S Ruling in C-366/10 on the Inclusion of Aviation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, 24 J. ENVTL. L. 345, 347 (2012). The Chicago Convention was not considered binding on the EU, since the EU is not a contracting
party to the agreement. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 57–71. The Kyoto Protocol
was also not considered a basis for natural persons to challenge the validity
of the Directive since it governs relations between states, and not individuals.
Id. ¶¶ 73–77. The court then considered the Open Skies Agreement. While
the court found that the airlines could rely on certain provisions of the Open
Skies Agreement to challenge the validity of the Directive, it found that the
Open Skies Agreement does not preclude application of the Directive to
flights that arrive or depart from aerodromes within the territory of the EU
when such a measure is uniformly applied to EU airlines. Id. ¶¶ 79–100,
131–57. Finally, the court considered customary international law, and held
that although individuals can challenge an act of the European Union utilizing principles of customary international law, the court’s review is limited to
a standard that requires the European Union to have committed manifest
error in adopting the challenged act. Id. ¶¶ 101–11, 130. The court did not
find manifest error in the EU’s adoption of the Directive in light of the customary international law principles that (1) “each State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over its airspace,” (2) “that no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty,” and (3) the “guarantee[] [of] freedom to fly over the high seas.” Id. ¶¶ 111, 114–30.
70. See ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 125–30. It is not uncommon for a State to
exercise its sovereignty extraterritorially; for example, anti-trust laws consider agreements outside the territorial jurisdiction of the regulating country.
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶¶ 145–49.
71. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 350–51.
72. Id. at 350–52. This is supported by the EU’s commitment in the Directive to continue to work towards a multilateral agreement and by the EU’s
intention to have the Directive complement similar programs developed in
other countries, as noted above in Part I.A. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 348;
Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 5, 17, art. 25.
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The claimants’ second contention was that the application of
a cap and trade scheme to aviation emissions should be negotiated and agreed upon within the ICAO, and not implemented
through the unilateral action of one party. 73 Their argument
was based on Article 2.2 of the Kyoto Protocol, which expresses
a preference for the ICAO to determine an appropriate approach to reducing aviation emissions.74 However, the European Court of Justice found that individuals cannot rely on the
Kyoto Protocol to challenge the validity of a measure of the European Parliament.75 Third, the complainants argued that the
Directive constitutes a “tax or charge on fuel” that is impermissible under the Open Skies Agreement. 76 The court rejected
this argument,77 and instead found that the emissions allowances are market-based measures.78
In upholding the validity of the Directive, the European
Court of Justice authorized the EU’s discretion to take unilateral environmental measures.79 The court’s decision marks the
transition of international climate change governance into the
“judicial realm,” a transition from global negotiations to re-

73. See generally ATAA, supra note 67; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶ 42.
74. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 45, 77; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott,
supra note 9, ¶ 183; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, art. 2.2. In her advisory
opinion, Advocate General Kokott argued that even if Article 2.2 expresses a
preference that a market-based measure for aviation be developed in the
ICAO, this does not bar the EU from implementing an independent program.
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶ 186. In addition, Advocate General Kokott pointed out that while the ICAO 36th Assembly made a
statement against unilateral action on aviation emissions, this was only a
non-binding political declaration and the EU Member States that are parties
to the ICAO reserved the right to use market-based measures. Id. ¶ 191.
75. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶ 77.
76. Id. ¶¶ 136–47; Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, at ¶¶
35–36.
77. ATAA, supra note 67, ¶¶ 136–47. In addition, the court found the Directive is not a “customs duty, tax, fee or charge on fuel” because there is no
direct link between the quantity of fuel consumed and the cost of allowance,
the cost of allowance determined by market price upon initial allocation. Id. ¶
142.
78. The EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme is a market-based measure in
that it is based on supply and demand of emissions allowances. Bogojević,
supra note 69, at 355. This is dissimilar from a tax that is “fixed in advance.”
Id.
79. See generally ATAA, supra note 67.

1164

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

gional judicial disputes.80 The aviation community, dissatisfied
with the ruling of the European Court of Justice, has threatened further legal action within the ICAO and the WTO. 81
While the extra-territorial application of the Directive is suspended pending the outcome of the ICAO 38th Assembly, the
EU clearly expressed its intention to reinstate the Directive if
insufficient progress is made.82 In the event that the extraterritorial application of the Directive is reinstated in the absence of
an international agreement, it is likely that an action would be
initiated within the ICAO’s dispute-resolution process, the result of which would be appealed to the WTO.83
C. Potential Challenges Under WTO Rules
The WTO was established in 1995 to facilitate trade between
WTO Member nations.84 The WTO is a rule-based organization
run by negotiated agreements, such as the GATT.85 Through
these agreements, the WTO seeks to foster “mutually advantageous arrangements” that reduce trade barriers and eliminate
discrimination in trade relations. 86 These principles serve to
“protect the value of trade concessions,” promote “free and fair
competition,” and protect against “corruption of the multilateral trading system” caused by the unequal treatment of trading partners.87
The WTO administers the rules and procedures of covered
agreements and settles trade disputes through its Dispute Settlement Body. 88 In the event of a conflict between member
80. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 356.
81. Joint Declaration of the Moscow Meeting on Inclusion of Civil Aviation
in
the
EU
ETS,
Russian
Aviation
(Feb.
22,
2012)
http://www.ruaviation.com/docs/1/2012/2/22/50/ [hereinafter Meeting on Inclusion of Civil Aviation in the EU ETS].
82. Commission Proposal on Derogation from EU ETS, supra note 16, at
4–5.
83. See Chicago Convention, supra note 9, art. 84; PURVIS & GRAUSZ, supra
note 17, at 6.
84. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
85. GATT, supra note 18. In addition to the GATT, the WTO has agreements that govern trade in services, intellectual property, and the settlement
of disputes. Id.
86. WTO Agreement, supra note 84.
87. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 145 (2008).
88. DSU, supra note 17, art. 1–19.
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states, an aggrieved party first engages in consultations with
the country it alleges acted in contravention of a WTO agreement.89 If the countries fail to settle the dispute independently,
the aggrieved party may then request that the WTO establish a
panel to make a ruling on the issue, the decision of which can
be appealed to the Appellate Body.90 If the panel or Appellate
Body determine that a country’s specific trade measure does
not conform to the WTO, the country must bring the measure
into compliance.91 If the offending party fails to do so within a
reasonable period, it will be subject to sanctions and the aggrieved party may be permitted to impose retaliatory
measures.92
While the Dispute Settlement Body cannot coerce nations to
comply with its decisions, the system works through “peer
pressure and the collective desire of all WTO Members to preserve the [multilateral trading] system.” 93 In this way, the
WTO is revealed to be an organization in which the principle
actors are national governments seeking to maintain the balance between a liberal trading system and domestic autonomy.94 The WTO and the Dispute Settlement Body must therefore be sensitive to states’ interests in order to “maximize the
political support for [its] decisions” and thereby maintain support for the WTO and its trade liberalization objectives.95
If the application of the Directive to non-EU airlines is reinstated after the 38th ICAO Assembly, an aggrieved nation can
request that the Dispute Settlement Body convene a panel.
Since it is estimated that the Directive will cost airlines up to
US$4.3 billion by 2015, airlines may deal with these costs by
passing them onto consumers in the price of tickets for flights,
89. Id. art. 4.
90. Id. art. 5–6.
91. Id. Annex 2.
92. Id. art. 22.
93. CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 87, at 52.
94. John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and
the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 47 (2004).
95. Id. While trade liberalization leads to productivity and welfare gains—
for example, globalization has added between $800 billion to $1.5 trillion to
the U.S. economy—it is often accompanied by concerns that domestic industry will be harmed by increased foreign competition. HOUSER ET. AL.,
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS & WORLD RESOURCES
INSTITUTE, LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD: INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION AND U.S. CLIMATE POLICY DESIGN 4 (2008).
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and in the price of goods transported by air.96 Due to the Directive’s effect on trade in goods, it is likely that the aggrieved
nation or nations will cite to the GATT in their complaint.97
The pass through of the costs of compliance with the Directive,
and the greater compliance costs for foreign airlines that fly
greater distances than domestic airlines, will lead to a violation
of the principle of non-discrimination, incorporated in the
GATT through GATT Article I Most-Favored Nation (“MFN”)
Treatment, and GATT Article III National Treatment.
MFN requires that any trade advantage a member gives to a
product originating in another country must be “immediately
and unconditionally” given to “like products 98 originating” in
the other WTO Member states. 99 The MFN clause is triggered
by the Directive’s conditional exemption for countries that
adopt their own climate reduction strategies for aviation.100 If
countries pass the cost of complying with the Directive into the
price of cargo, two countries that import a like product—one
that has received the exemption and one that has not—would
pay different cargo rates.101 For example, consider a situation
where Country A and Country B both import a like product into the EU.102 If the EU were to then exempt Country A from
the Directive, Country A would face lower cargo rates for its
product than Country B. 103 This would result in differential
treatment between the two countries, and call the consistency

96. If airlines pass the cost of compliance into the cost of tickets on commercial flights, this could result in an increase cost per passenger from $2.60
to $6.00. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 121.
97. Id. at 127. While the decision to pass compliance costs into the price of
goods will be made by private companies, the EU is not relieved of its obligations under the GATT because the requirements of the Directive are what
necessitate this private choice. See Appellate Body Report, Korea–Measures
Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 146, WT/DS161/AB/R,
WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); see Meltzer, supra note 7, at 133.
98. Whether two products are considered “like” depends upon the similarities between the products’ end-uses, consumers’ tastes and preferences, physical characteristics, and tariff classifications. Appellate Body Report, Japan–
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 20–23, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996).
99. GATT, supra note 18, art. I, ¶ 1.
100. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 137.
101. Id. at 137–38.
102. See id. at 138.
103. Id.
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of the Directive with the MFN principle of unconditionality into
question.104
The principle of non-discrimination is also found in GATT Article III, “National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation.”105 The National Treatment provision requires that foreign goods be treated no less favorably than domestic goods,
extending the principle of non-discrimination to the treatment
of foreign goods once they enter the domestic market.106 GATT
Article III:2 states that products imported by a contracting party “shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes
or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”107 If the purchase of emissions allowances is considered an indirect tax or
charge, then imported products may be considered taxed “in
excess” of like domestic products, constituting de facto discrimination as a result of the greater distance the products are
transported.108 In addition, GATT Article III:1 prohibits internal taxes, charges, laws and regulations, applied “so as to afford protection to domestic production.”109 The Directive explicitly references competitiveness concerns alongside its environmental objectives in enacting the measure.110 If a panel finds
the primary purpose of the Directive is to protect domestic airlines from competition, the Directive would be found in violation of Article III:1.111
104. Id. at 137–38.
105. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 2.
106. Id. art. III. National Treatment encompasses internal taxes and charges, including those imposed at the border, and internal regulations that govern the “conditions of sale and purchase,” including regulations that adversely effect the conditions of competition between the domestic and imported
goods. See, Id. art. III; Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against
Imported Agricultural Machinery, ¶ 12, L/833 (Jul. 15, 1958); GATT B.I.S.D.
(7th Supp.) at 60 (1958).
107. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 2.
108. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 133–34. The European Court of Justice’s determination that the emissions allowances were not a tax or charge in Air
Transp. Ass’n of Am. does not dictate whether the Directive will be found to
be a tax or a charge under GATT Article III:2, since the European Court of
Justice’s interpretation was made under a different agreement. Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott, supra note 9, ¶¶ 35–38; Meltzer, supra note 7, at
130.
109. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 1.
110. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 16.
111. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 135.
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The Directive is also inconsistent with GATT Article III:4.112
GATT Article III:4 requires that “the products of the territory
of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin.”113 The purchase of a greater number of GHG emission
allowances because of greater distances flown involves a cost
on imported goods that is not imposed on like domestic goods,
and therefore constitutes less favorable treatment in violation
of Article III:4.114 However, the Directive’s violation of GATT
Articles I and III is not dispositive of its conformity with its
WTO obligations. As a measure intended to address global climate change that is “otherwise inconsistent with GATT,” the
environmental objectives of the measure may entitle it to justification under the General Exceptions of GATT Article XX for
social and environmental measures.115
II. GATT ARTICLE XX AND THE AVIATION DIRECTIVE
A. The General Exceptions of GATT Article XX
The determination of whether a trade restrictive measure is
justified under GATT Article XX requires a two-tiered analysis.116 First, a panel will examine whether the measure falls
within one of the ten categories of social and environmental
exceptions of Article XX.117 Second, if the measure is found to
fall within one of the exceptions, it must also satisfy the requirements of the introductory clause to Article XX, the chapeau.118 A measure violates the chapeau to Article XX if the
application of the measure results in discrimination that is
“arbitrary or unjustifiable,” and “between countries where the

112. Id.
113. GATT, supra note 18, art. III, ¶ 4.
114. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 136.
115. Knox, supra note 94, at 9; GATT, supra note 18, art. XX.
116. Appellate Body Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, 22–23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996).
117. Id.
118. Id. The chapeau to Article XX is a principle of “good faith” that attempts to prevent the “nullification or impairment” of the rights of other
members by the improper use of the Article XX exceptions. United States–
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, supra note 20, ¶ 159.
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same conditions prevail,” or where the measure constitutes a
“disguised restriction on trade.”119
The Directive falls within two of the GATT Article XX exceptions. The first is GATT Article XX(g), which exempts measures
relating to the “conservation of exhaustible natural resources”
that are “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” 120 The Appellate Body in
U.S.–Shrimp, “open[ed] the door to unilateral environmental
measures under Article XX(g),” when it found that the United
States’ unilateral “import ban on shrimp harvested” in a way
that endangers certain species of sea turtles fell within the Article XX(g) exception. 121 The Appellate Body’s interpretation
allows countries to condition market access on compliance with
unilateral environmental measures under GATT Article XX(g),
yet it also marks the transition of the WTO’s disfavor of unilateral measures into the chapeau.122 This reflects the WTO’s concern that trade restrictive environmental policies will be used
as a façade for trade protectionism.123
Under GATT Article XX(g), for a measure to be considered
“relating to” legitimate ends, the means must be narrowly focused and “reasonably related to [those] ends.”124 An “exhaustible natural resource” is something that has value and that is
capable of being depleted either quantitatively or qualitative-

119. The term “discrimination” in the chapeau does not refer to the same
“discrimination” referenced in the “substantive obligations of GATT 1994.”
United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate
Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 150.
120. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX(g). The Appellate Body’s decision in
U.S.–Gasoline sheds light on what it considers when it examines a “measure”
under GATT Article XX(g). The Appellate Body only found it necessary to
review the particular provisions of the gasoline rule that were under review,
and not the rule as a whole. United States–Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 13–14.
This implies that if the extraterritorial application of the Directive is struck
down before the WTO, the remaining provisions of the Directive can be preserved.
121. Gaines, supra note 20, at 749; United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 138, 145.
122. Gaines, supra note 20, at 744.
123. See GATT, supra note 18, art. XX.
124. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 138, 141.
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ly.125 For example, in U.S.–Gasoline, the panel found that clean
air was an exhaustible natural resource as it had value and
was capable of being depleted through pollution, which had a
negative impact on air quality. 126 “Exhaustible natural resources” may be living or non-living, and do not necessarily
have to be finite.127 The final requirement of Article XX(g) is
implementation in conjunction with similar domestic measures
to guarantee “even-handedness in the imposition of [the] restrictions” domestically and on imports.128
The objective of the Directive is to stabilize GHG emissions
from international air transport to mitigate the effects of climate change, including risk to ecosystems, to food production,
and to human health and security.129 The reduction of atmospheric concentrations of GHG emissions has a qualitative effect, in that it reduces secondary detrimental effects to the environment and human health. Therefore, the means of the Di125. Panel Report, United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.37, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). This panel’s finding that
clean air is an exhaustible natural resource was not challenged in the appellate body report. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116. Consideration of what
constitutes an “exhaustible natural resource” is considered “in light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and
conservation of the environment.” United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 129.
126. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Panel Report, supra note 125, ¶ 6.37.
127. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 128, 131. It is unclear whether there is a
jurisdictional requirement to invoking the Article XX exception. However in
U.S.–Shrimp, the migratory species of turtle protected by the U.S. measure
was considered to have a sufficient jurisdictional nexus with the United
States for regulation, even when some of the species regulated under the
measure never entered U.S. jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 133. The EU’s Directive has a
jurisdictional nexus with the EU as it seeks to protect the “atmosphere,”
which is part of the global commons. Bartels, supra note 55, at 450.
128. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 20–21. U.S.–Gasoline interpreted
this provision as “primarily aimed” at conservation goals. Id. The subsequent
effects of the measure do not have to be immediate, as “a substantial period
of time . . . may have to elapse before the effects attributable to implementation of a given measure may be observable.” Id. However, if a measure “cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation goals,”
the Appellate Body considered it likely that the measure was not primarily
aimed at achieving the stated goals to begin with. Id. at 21–22.
129. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 2–3, 10, 14.
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rective relate to its ends of climate change mitigation. The Directive is “even-handed,” in that it applies equally to all flights
that land or depart from an aerodrome in the EU, regardless of
whether they are international or domestic flights.130 Thus, the
Directive falls under the Article XX(g) exception.
The Directive also falls under Article XX(b), exempting
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health.”131 For a measure to be necessary, the degree to which
it materially contributes to reaching its objective is “weighed
against its trade restrictiveness.”132 It does not have to be indispensable, but there must be no reasonable alternative that
is more consistent with the GATT.133 Furthermore, even if a
measure’s contribution is not “immediately observable,” but
spread out over time, it may still be justified under Article
XX(b) when such projections are supported by quantitative or
qualitative evidence. 134
The Directive makes a material contribution to the reduction
of GHG emissions in that it increases the price of allowances
over time, providing an increasing economic incentive to minimize and reduce emissions. 135 In addition, revenue from the
sale of allowances is donated to efforts to fight and adapt to
climate change, which further contributes to its goals.136 It remains to be seen whether opponents of the Directive will propose less trade restrictive alternatives that are more consistent
with the GATT, and whether the Directive will prevail over
these alternatives.137
130. Id. ¶ 16, art. 1.
131. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX(b).
132. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body
Report, supra note 22, ¶ 210.
133. Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh Chilled and Frozen Beef,
Appellate Body Report, supra note 97, ¶ 161. While there may be no reasonable alternative more consistent with the GATT, the country defending the
measure does not have to identify and discount all potential alternatives.
Bartels, supra note 55, at 451.
134. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body
Report, supra note 22, ¶ 151. The Appellate Body in Brazil–Tyres further
stated that, “the result obtained from certain actions—for instance, measures
adopted in order to attenuate global warming and climate change . . . may
manifest themselves only after a certain period of time [and] can only be
evaluated with the benefit of time.” Id.
135. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 143.
136. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, at 22.
137. Bartels, supra note 55, at 451.

1172

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

Opponents of the Directive argue that if airlines pass the cost
of complying with the Directive directly into cargo rates, there
is no incentive for airlines to reduce overall emissions, weighing against a finding that the measure relates to its conservation goals under Article XX(g).138 However, a panel may interpret this pass through as a transition of the Directive’s policy
objectives into the price of goods—since the increase is still correlated to GHG emissions—thus maintaining the measure’s
provisional justification under Article XX(g).139 While the Article XX(b) “necessary” requirement is more stringent than the
relationship of “relating to” in Article XX(g), both exceptions
serve to justify the Directive.
B. The Chapeau to Article XX
Once the Directive is provisionally justified by one of the Article XX exceptions, the panel will examine the measure under
the chapeau to Article XX. While U.S.–Shrimp established the
permissibility of unilateral environmental measures under Article XX(g), the strict requirements of the chapeau remain a
formidable obstacle and have been compared to the “eye of the
needle” through which hardly any environmental measures
will be able to pass.140 The chapeau to Article XX requires that
application of these measures does not constitute:
(a) “arbitrary discrimination” (between countries where the
same conditions prevail);
(b) “unjustifiable discrimination” with the same qualifier; or
(c) “disguised restriction on international trade.”141

Violation of any one of the three standards disqualifies the
measure from justification under Article XX. 142 The chapeau
ensures that discriminatory measures that are considered “jus138. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 141.
139. Id. at 144–45.
140. Gaines, supra note 20, at 741, 773.
141. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 23.
142. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 184. Under the chapeau, the party invoking the Article XX exceptions has the burden of showing that its measure is
not applied so “as to frustrate or defeat the legal obligations of the holder of
the right.” United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 32.
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tified” under the Article XX exceptions are based on a nonprotectionist rationale. 143 A court making a determination of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination will look at whether
the cause or rationale for the discrimination bears a relationship to the legitimate objective of the measure.144
The first standard of the chapeau, arbitrary discrimination,
looks at the procedures for implementing a measure, their flexibility, and the degree to which they take into account “the appropriateness of [the] programme for the conditions prevailing
in the exporting country.” 145 In U.S.–Shrimp, the Appellate
Body found the U.S.’s certification process denied certification
to any country that did not impose the exact shrimp trawling
methods unilaterally prescribed by the United States, regardless of the effectiveness of alternatives.146 The rote application
of these standards lacked procedural fairness as certification
decisions were made without a formal notification or review
process.147 The Appellate Body found that the rigidity and inflexibility of the U.S. certification “could result in the negation
of rights of Members,” and therefore constituted arbitrary discrimination.148
143. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 15; Gaines, supra note 20, at 739. The
burden of proving that a measure “provisionally justified” under the Article
XX exceptions does not constitute discrimination under the chapeau falls on
the party invoking the exception. United States–Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 22–23.
144. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body
Report, supra note 22, ¶¶ 226–27. While the effects of the discrimination are
also a relevant factor, they are not dispositive. For example, in Brazil–Tyres,
the Appellate Body found that the panel used the incorrect analysis to interpret the term “unjustifiable discrimination,” by focusing exclusively on the
quantitative impact of the discrimination on achieving the environmental
objective of the measure. Id. ¶¶ 229–30.
145. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 54; Panel Report, United States–
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, ¶ 5.122, WT/DS58/RW (Jun. 15, 2001).
146. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 177, 180.
147. The U.S. certification process provided no opportunity for member
countries “to be heard, or to respond to any arguments made against it . . .
before a decision to grant or to deny certification [was] made.” Id. ¶¶ 177,
180–81. While a “list of approved applications [was] published in the Federal
Register,” there was no opportunity to request review of, or appeal a decision
of, denial. Id.
148. Id. ¶¶ 181, 184.

1174

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

The determination of unjustifiable discrimination looks at the
substance of the application of the measure. 149 In U.S.–
Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that the United States’ import ban constituted “unjustifiable discrimination” for several
reasons. First, the Appellate Body found the application of the
U.S. measure required countries to “adopt essentially the same
regulatory program as the U.S.,” even if the members’ alternative programs served the United States’ declared policy goal.150
This rigid and inflexible standard failed to take into account
the different conditions within the member countries, constituting unjustifiable discrimination. 151 Second, the Appellate
Body found unjustifiable discrimination in the United States’
failure to conduct across-the-board negotiations with member
countries that exported shrimp with the purpose of reaching a
multilateral or bilateral agreement prior to enforcing its ban.152
Lastly, the Appellate Body noted the application of the United
States’ measure was unilateral in character, heightening its
“disruptive and discriminatory influence” and “underscoring its
unjustifiability.”153
Under the third standard of the chapeau to Article XX, a
measure must not constitute a “disguised restriction on international trade.”154 Three standards are used to determine if a
member is using the GATT Article XX exceptions to intention-

149. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 54.
150. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 164–65.
151. See Id. ¶¶ 161, 165–66, 172; HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 55.
152. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 166. While there was no requirement for
the conclusion of an agreement, the United States needed to make “serious,
good faith efforts” to negotiate such an agreement to meet the requirements
of the chapeau. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, ¶ 123, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001). In addition, the Appellate
Body found it dispositive that the United States had not negotiated equally
with all members affected by the ban and had not provided equal support in
the form of transfer of TED technology to the countries involved. United
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 175.
153. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 172.
154. GATT, supra note 18, art. XX.
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ally “conceal the pursuit of trade-restrictive objectives.” 155
First, the publicity test requires that the measure be publicly
announced.156 Second, measures that constitute “arbitrary discrimination” and “unjustifiable discrimination” have been interpreted to lead to a determination that a measure is also a
“disguised restriction on trade.”157 Third, the “design, architecture and revealing structure”158 of the measure may reveal a
protectionist objective.159
The underlying purpose of the three standards in the chapeau is to avoid the abuse of the “exceptions to substantive
rules” of the GATT provided in Article XX.160 The clause thereby serves to balance a WTO Member’s legal right to invoke an
Article XX exception, with the rights of other WTO Members.161
This balancing mechanism has been described as a sliding
scale that is evaluated on a case-by-case basis and that, when
used to strike a balance between trade and environmental concerns, has incorporated a preference for multilateralism.162
C. Application of the Chapeau to Article XX to the Aviation Directive
The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp recognized that unilateral environmental measures that serve one of the legitimate
155. Panel Report, European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 8.236, WT/DS135/R (Sep. 18, 2000), quoted
in Committee on Trade and Environment, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement
Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), ¶¶ 78–79,
WT/CTE/W/203 (Mar. 8, 2002).
156. In EC–Asbestos, the panel considered the publication of the measure in
an official journal of the member state to satisfy this requirement. European
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Panel Report, supra note 155, ¶ 8.234.
157. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 25; GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), supra
note 155, ¶ 82.
158. Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, supra
note 98, at 29.
159. European Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, Panel Report, supra note 155, ¶ 8.236.
160. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 25.
161. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 156.
162. Id. ¶ 159; Knox, supra note 94, at 56–57.
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objectives in the GATT Article XX exceptions are not “a priori
incapable of justification under Article XX.” 163 The Appellate
Body’s respect for the environmental policies of WTO Member
countries was expressed in U.S.–Gasoline: “WTO Members
have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade),
their environmental objectives, and the environmental legislation they enact and implement.”164 The Appellate Body found
this interest to only be circumscribed by the substantive obligations of GATT and the other WTO agreements. 165 However,
while the Directive is provisionally justified under the Article
XX exceptions of “conserving exhaustible natural resources,”
and protecting “human, animal and plant life and health,” the
application of the Directive constitutes arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination under the chapeau.
Two scenarios identify implicit “arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination” in the application of the Directive. The first
scenario arises from the Directive’s method for regulating aviation emissions. Aviation emissions are calculated by monitoring
fuel consumption for the full length of the flight between the
EU and a non-EU country. 166 The Appellate Body has found
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination to exist when a WTO
Member State’s justification for a discriminatory measure
bears no rational connection to, or goes against the stated objective of, the measure that permitted it to fall under the GATT
Article XX exceptions.167 Under the EU’s method for monitoring
aviation emissions, two flights that travel the same distance
can be responsible for a different number of allowances if one of
the flights makes an intermediate landing outside the EU, as is

163. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 121.
164. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 30.
165. Id.
166. Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(b), Annex IV(B).
167. Brazil–Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, Appellate Body
Report, supra note 22, ¶ 227. The Appellate Body in Brazil–Tyres ruled that
even though Brazil’s discrimination resulted from its compliance with a ruling from the MERCOSUR arbitral tribunal, even a rational decision can be
characterized as “arbitrary or unjustifiable” if it is not related “to the legitimate objectives pursued by the” measure that lead it to fall within the GATT
Article XX exceptions. Id. at ¶232.
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done with connecting flights.168 This may even result in a direct
flight being responsible for more emissions than an indirect
flight that traveled a greater distance, but made an intermediate stop prior to entering the EU.169 This effect would result in
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination because it erodes the
relationship between the measure and its GHG reduction goals,
and may even be used as a means for airlines to evade the
measure, leading to a net increase in GHG emissions.170
The second scenario arises if airlines choose to pass the costs
of complying with the Directive into cargo rates, resulting in
increased prices for goods that are flown greater distances.171
Since the Directive only considers the CO2 emissions produced
in the air transport of the good, this would constitute arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination because the distance flown is
not indicative of a good’s overall carbon footprint.172 For example, an aircraft operator transporting a good with a relatively
large carbon footprint, but only for a short distance, would be
responsible for fewer allowances than an aircraft operator
transporting a good with a minimal carbon footprint that traveled a greater distance.173 Thus, the Directive disregards efficiency improvements that reduce GHG emissions in the production and processing methods of goods, which also contribute
to climate change mitigation.174 Similar to U.S.–Shrimp, this
overlooks the EU’s declared objective to reduce global GHG
emissions.
A determination of “arbitrary discrimination” also looks specifically at the procedures for implementing a measure and
whether they take the conditions existing in other countries
into account while continuing to serve the measure’s policy objective.175 When the application of a measure disserves the poli168. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 145. Bartels, supra note 55, at 458.
169. Id.
170. See Meltzer, supra note 7, at 146.
171. Id. at 144–45.
172. Id. A “carbon footprint” accounts for either the total CO2, or the total
CO2 and non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions, for the complete lifecycle of a
good, from cradle to grave. See Report of the Commission Joint Research Centre on the ‘Carbon Footprint – what it is and how to measure it’, (2007), available at http://lct.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pdf-directory/Carbon-footprint.pdf.
173. Meltzer, supra note 7, at 144–45.
174. See id. at 146.
175. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 177.
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cy objectives asserted to justify its trade restrictive effect, it
constitutes “arbitrary discrimination.” 176 However, procedural
and due process safeguards can weigh against a finding of “arbitrary discrimination.” For example, the elements of an opportunity for exporting members to be heard, and a notification
and review process were considered to incorporate flexibility
into a measure and responsiveness to the conditions existing in
the other country. 177 The operation of the Directive relies in
large part on the direct participation and supply of information
by aircraft operators.178 Under the Directive, aircraft operators
submit applications for the free allowances granted by the EU,
monitor their annual CO2 emissions, and submit information
on their annual emissions to an accredited verifier.179 In addition, the executive body of the EU, the European Commission,
publishes an annual list of aircraft operators whose activities
are covered by the Directive.180 The direct participation of aircraft operators in the operation of the Directive will serve to
alleviate due process and procedural fairness concerns.
To avoid a finding of “unjustifiable discrimination,” a country
imposing a unilateral environmental measure must conduct
across-the-board negotiations towards a multilateral agreement.181 The EU is a major actor in negotiations for international climate policy, an area in which it supports multilateral

176. The U.S.–Shrimp Recourse to Article 21.5 indicates that the Appellate
Body’s concern with the import ban was its “coercive” nature that disregarded the conditions and views of other member states. Gaines, supra note 20, at
797; Knox, supra note 94, at 57–58. Since certification under the program
was not granted to countries that used measures “comparable in effectiveness” to the U.S. method for protecting turtles, the Appellate Body viewed the
application of the measure to serve the policy objective of ensuring exporting
members adopted the exact same regulatory program as the United States,
and not the declared objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body
Report, supra note 20, ¶ 165.
177. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 177, 180–81.
178. See Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1, art. 3(e), 15.
179. Id.
180. Id. art. 18(a); European Commission, Questions and Answers on historic aviation emissions and the inclusion of aviation in the EU’s Emission Trading
Scheme
(EU
ETS),
at
27
(2013),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/faq_en.htm.
181. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶¶ 165–66.
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cooperation to address this global environmental problem. 182
The EU plays a leading role in climate policy negotiations within the UNFCCC, and other multilateral forums including the
ICAO, where it has observer status.183 The EU’s participation
in negotiations within the ICAO and its continued efforts to
advance the negotiation process fulfill the negotiation requirement.184
Lastly, whether the Directive is considered a “disguised restriction on international trade” depends on the criterion
adopted by the Appellate Body to make the determination. The
Directive would likely not be considered a disguised restriction
on trade under the “publicity test,” because the regulation was
published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 185
Second, if the Appellate Body collapses the determination of
whether the Directive constitutes “arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination” or a “disguised restriction on trade” into one
analysis, the findings above would make it unnecessary to examine this element separately.186 Under the third criterion, the
182. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171, 173.
183. Id. at 181; see Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 26, at 35–37. While all
twenty-seven EU Member States are contracting parties to the Chicago Convention that established the ICAO, the European Union only has observer
status. “Observer Status” is a means by which intergovernmental organizations can observe meetings of the WTO. See WTO Agreement, supra note 84,
art. V; World Trade Organization, Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the Ministerial Conference and Meetings of the General Council, ch. IV, WT/L/161
(Jul. 25, 1996).
184. Commission Proposal on Derogation form EU ETS, supra note 16, at
4–5.
185. See Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1.
186. The Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp found it was not necessary to analyze whether the U.S.’s import ban was a “disguised restriction on international trade,” since it was already found to constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination and therefore was not justified under Article XX. United
States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 184. It is unclear whether the Appellate Body in U.S.–
Shrimp held either that a measure constituting arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination is a disguised restriction on trade, or that it is not necessary to
look at the third standard under the chapeau since the measure already constitutes “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination.” While U.S.–Shrimp
seems to take the former approach, the Appellate Body in U.S.–Gasoline took
the latter. United States–Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, supra note 116, at 25 (considering a disguised
restriction on international trade “as embracing restrictions amounting to
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under
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Directive would not be considered a “disguised restriction on
international trade,” since the “design, architecture and revealing structure” of the Directive incorporate the principle of nondiscrimination and a commitment to a multilateral solution.187
Therefore, if the Appellate Body considers this third element of
the chapeau separately, it will find that the Directive does not
constitute a “disguised restriction on international trade.”
With the deferment of the Directive’s application to non-EU
airlines, it remains to be seen whether the Directive will incorporate sufficient flexibility and sensitivity to the conditions in
other states to withstand scrutiny under the chapeau. This is
because it is the application of the measure and not the EU’s
expressed intentions that dictate whether the measure will
constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.188 However, the EU will not be able to avoid the “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination” that is implicit in the application of the
Directive.
While the Appellate Body in U.S.–Shrimp found the United
States’ “rigid and inflexible” measure to constitute “arbitrary
and unjustifiable discrimination,” the United States was able
to bring its measure into conformity with the WTO by revising
its guidelines. 189 Therefore, if the EU were to revise the Dithe guise of a measure formally within the terms of an exception listed in
Article XX”).
187. See generally Council Directive 2008/101/EC, supra note 1. The principles of non-discrimination are seen in the conditional exemption to the Directive. Id. art. 25(a). In addition, the Directive expresses the EU’s continued
commitment to working towards a multilateral agreement for aviation emissions. Id. at 17.
188. See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 160; European Communities–Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos–Containing Products, Panel Report, supra
note 155, ¶ 8.226; GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT
Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), supra note 155, ¶ 65; Report of the
Panel, United States–Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from
Canada, ¶ 4.8, L/5198 (Dec. 22, 1981), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91
(1982), noted in GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT
Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g), supra note 155, ¶¶ 80–81.
189. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products Recourse
to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, Appellate Body Report, supra note
152, ¶ 153. The United States made several changes to its original program
in the revised guidelines in an attempt to take the different conditions in the
exporting countries into account in the implementation of its measure. First,
the United States amended its criteria for certifying exporting members programs to protect endangered sea turtles to accept programs that were “com-
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rective to remedy the elements that constitute “arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination,” it is likely an Appellate Body
would consider the revised measure to fall within GATT Article
XX. Yet even if the Directive is justified under GATT Article
XX, the EU should refrain from imposing its program on nonEU airlines in the absence of a multilateral agreement on the
regulation of aviation emissions.
III. MULTILATERALISM AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE GLOBAL
CLIMATE REGIME
A. The Multilateral vs. Unilateral Approach
The WTO’s preference for multilateral environmental agreements 190 is based on the nature of environmental problems,
which transcend geographic boundaries and require the efforts
of more than one country to provide effective solutions.191 Uniparable in effectiveness” to the use of Turtle Excluder Devices. Id. ¶ 5. Second, the Revised Guidelines also allowed certification for exporting countries
that trawl for shrimp in waters where there is no risk for capture of sea turtles, or whose means of shrimp fishing do not put sea turtles at risk, such as
artisanal shrimp fishing methods. Id. ¶ 7.
190. Both, the United Nations and the WTO incorporate the principle of
multilateralism into their conception of environmental governance. In the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, the U.N. opted to support an
“international consensus” to address global environmental issues, and explicitly listed the avoidance of unilateral measures as one of its principles. U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Princ. 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992);
See, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, supra
note 20, ¶168. Similarly, the WTO’s Agenda 21 Decision on Trade and Environment advises against unilateral action, supporting an international approach to trans-boundary environmental problems. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, ¶¶ 1.1–2.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26
(1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]; See United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, ¶ 168. WTO
Director-General Pascal Lamy elaborated on the importance of a multilateral
approach to addressing climate change in his statement that “[a] multilateral
agreement that includes all major emitters would be the best placed international instrument to guide other instruments, such as the WTO.” Pascal
Lamy, A Consensual International Accord on Climate Change is Needed,
Temporary Committee on Climate Change, European Parliament (May 29,
2008), quoted in, HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 99.
191. Cf., United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report, supra note 20, at ¶ 168 (noting that the species of turtles
the United States sought to protect in U.S.–Shrimp were migratory, so solely
implementing a domestic measure would not have served the objectives of the
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lateral environmental measures with extraterritorial effects
run the risk of negating the rights of other WTO Members by
disregarding the conditions existing in those countries, as well
as their views on how to address the common environmental
problem.192 When such unilateral measures are imposed by one
of the larger economic powers, such as the United States in
U.S.–Shrimp, they can serve to effectively coerce less-powerful
countries into adopting their standards.193
A second concern with the authorization of the Directive, as a
unilateral environmental measure, is its potential to lead to
fragmentation of measures to address aviation emissions. 194
This fragmentation, with different programs adopted by individual countries, will create a “political maelstrom,”195 and instigate repeat challenges within the WTO on whether the imposition of these measures on members, without their consent,
is based on protectionist motives.196 Such challenges will create
a period of uncertainty and increased tensions due to these
competing regulatory measures, not only freezing any forward
action in efforts to address climate change, but also undermining the effectiveness of these measures as tools to address environmental problems.197
In contrast, a multilateral environmental agreement is an
expression of consensus among international actors that can
shift current conceptions of the value and importance of addressing global climate change.198 Through this shift, a set of
policy since efforts in the importing member would be effectively nullified by
the lack of regulation in other countries).
192. United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report supra note 20, at ¶181; see Knox, supra note 94, at 58.
193. See Gregory Shaffer & Daniel Bodansky, Transnationalism, Unilateralism, and International Law, 1 TRANSNATIONAL ENVTL. L. 31, 33–34, 37–38
(2012) (noting that the extraterritorial application of environmental standards by “dominant market actors” oftentimes leads other states to adopt similar standards, contributing to a “growing convergence of environmental laws”
internationally); Gaines, supra note 20, at 797.
194. HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 20, at 96.
195. Id.
196. Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 40–41.
197. Id. at 39–41.
198. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171. See also, Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910 (1996) (arguing that laws expressing social values and shifting “social norms” can influence peoples’ personal conceptions of what is considered acceptable and the
way those people value certain goods).
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values and principles emerge that redefine what is considered
the appropriate response to international environmental problems.199 Multilateral environmental agreements can stimulate
the spread and acceptance of environmental legal norms in international environmental law, which then can then be “downloaded,” or replicated into national and regional regulatory
programs. 200 Even non-binding multilateral environmental
agreements can play a role in developing “recognition of environmental values,” which in the WTO context can serve as
guidance for panels and appellate bodies in their assessment of
climate change measures. 201 While unilateral environmental
measures can contribute to the creation of environmental
norms, they also tend to instigate “significant diplomatic tensions, resentment and concern.”202 Resistance to unilateral environmental measures can undermine their effectiveness and
dilute or eliminate their ability to influence “norms of behavior.”203
In response to criticism on the unilateral nature of the Directive, members of the European Commission expressed concern that other countries’ demands for a multilateral climate
agreement merely disguise their efforts to prevent full implementation of the Directive and to forestall action in other forums, such as the ICAO.204 Proponents of unilateral environmental trade measures argue that such measures can be used
as a tool to pressure other countries to change their policies; as
one author has put it, “to deny a regime the benefits of unilat-

199. Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 617 (2009); Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171. Sunstein defines “norms” as “social attitudes of approval
and disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be
done.” Sunstein, supra note 198, at 914. These norms can also be codified into
law. Id. at 914–15.
200. Yang & Percival, supra note 199, at 645–66.
201. Id. at 646. In resolving disputes involving trade and the environment,
the Appellate Body has historically examined the plain meaning of the text of
the GATT, and when the text is unclear, resorts to substantive principles
held in “environmental treaties and declarations” that have received widespread political support. Knox, supra note 94, at 3, 50–59.
202. Yang & Percival, supra note 199, at 648–49.
203. Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 40–41.
204. Remarks of Mr. Hahn, EUR. PARL. DEB. (O-0127) (Sep. 21, 2010), available
at,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//TEXT+CRE+20100921+ITEM-015+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.
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eral action is to deny the prospect of change.”205 Unilateral environmental measures are also a method for expediently pursuing solutions to environmental problems, such as climate
change, in which quick and effective action is critical.206 In contrast, multilateral negotiations threaten to exacerbate the inexpediency with which environmental solutions are formulated,
as the negotiation process is characteristically slow, expensive,
politicized, and typically results in only aspirational standards
rather than binding commitments.207 Therefore, a decision in
the WTO to block the EU from including non-EU airlines in the
Directive may effectively strip the EU of its ability to protect
its domestic environment.208
However, recent developments within the ICAO show that a
global market-based measure for aviation emissions may be on
the horizon. In 2009, the ICAO endorsed an action plan that
included aspirational goals for fuel efficiency and metrics to
measure progress. 209 The following year, the 37th ICAO Assembly resolved to achieve a “global annual average fuel efficiency improvement of 2 percent until 2020” and encouraged
member states to submit action plans on how to achieve this
goal. 210 The ICAO also resolved to develop a framework for
market-based measures for international aviation to be reviewed at the 38th ICAO Assembly.211 Since the 37th Assembly, the ICAO has agreed to a CO2 metric system and has
formed a high-level group to address policy issues relating to
the feasibility of a market-based mechanism for international
aviation.212 Most recently, the ICAO reached an agreement on
certification procedures to complement aircraft CO2 emissions

205. Gaines, supra note 20, at 810.
206. Marc Rietvelt, Multilateral Failure: A Comprehensive Analysis of the
Shrimp/Turtle Decision, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 473, 495 (2005).
207. Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 32–33 (assuming that the EU’s
proposal is non-discriminatory under WTO rules); Rietvelt, supra note 206, at
495.
208. See Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 39–40.
209. ICAO Assemb. Res. A37-19, supra note 60.
210. Id. at 4, 13.
211. Id. at 6–8.
212. ICAO, New Progress on Aircraft CO2 Standard. COM 15/12 (2012);
ICAO, New ICAO Council High-Level Group to Focus on Environmental Policy Challenges, COM 20/12 (2012).
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standards.213 The practical steps the ICAO has taken towards a
market-based mechanism for aviation emissions are indicative
of an “alignment of political will” within the industry to come to
an agreement on emissions reductions.214
When considering whether the EU should continue to unilaterally enforce the Directive or defer to the multilateral process,
the likelihood that the Directive will create environmental
norms must be balanced against the likelihood that the measure will spur greater resistance and undermine the legitimacy
of the global climate regime.215 Although the EU deferred the
enforcement of the Directive to non-EU airlines to allow additional time for a multilateral agreement within the ICAO, the
EU will reinstate the enforcement of the non-EU airline’s obligations under the Directive if the ICAO 38th Assembly does
not make “clear and sufficient”216 progress on such an agreement.217 However, even if sufficient progress is not made at the
38th ICAO Assembly, the EU should refrain from reinstating
the application of the Directive to non-EU airlines.
B. The European Union’s Role in the International Climate
Change Regime
The EU should continue to suspend the extraterritorial application of the Directive, because instead of creating environmental norms, the Directive will put the legitimacy of the WTO at
risk and undermine the utility of unilateral environmental
trade measures as a tool to address environmental problems.
While the EU has the potential to serve as a “norm entrepre-

213. ICAO, ICAO Environmental Protection Committee Delivers Progress on
New Aircraft CO2 and Noise Standards, COM 4/13 (2013).
214. See Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Toward an International
Aviation Emissions Agreement, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 351, 354–55 (2012).
215. See Shaffer & Bodansky, supra note 193, at 39–40.
216. The European Commission expects the ICAO Assembly to “agree on a
global market-based measure with a realistic timetable for further development and implementation,” and “a framework for facilitating [Member]
States’ application of national and regional market based measure,” until the
global measure comes into effect. European Commission, Frequently Asked
Questions With Regard to Commission Proposal to Defer EU ETS International Aviation Compliance by One Year, ¶ 7.1, COM(2012) 697 (Jan. 11,
2013), available at, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/
docs/20130111_qa_en.pdf.
217. Commission Proposal on Derogation from EU ETS, supra note 16, at
4–5.
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neur” and transfer its environmental values to its trade partners, it has yet to “successfully upload these norms,” or their
underlying principles “to the global level.”218 This was seen in
the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol and in the negotiations
leading up to the Copenhagen Accord, where the EU played a
leading role in driving negotiations forward, but failed to convince the other parties to the negotiations to adopt its positions
on how to address global climate change.219
The EU has a pattern of getting international actors to the
negotiating table, but once there, exerting minimal influence in
persuading other countries to buy into its position on global
environmental governance. There are several explanations for
the gap between the EU’s environmental goals and its ability to
transfer these norms to other international actors. The first is
a result of a conflict of values between the EU and other key
actors in climate negotiations.220 The EU is a “norm-driven actor,” and shapes its climate policy around its concerns for protecting its “environmental, economic, and security-related” interests in the long-term, even if it is necessary to incur costs in
the short-term. 221 In contrast, countries such as the United
States, Japan, and four of the larger developing economies,
Brazil, South Africa, India and China (“BASIC”), are “interestdriven actors,” focused on protecting their short-term economic
interests.222
These ideological differences imbue uncertainty and distrust
into the negotiating process that can lead parties to become
suspicious of their opponents potential ulterior motives.223 This
results in a politicization of climate change discussions that
can lead to a stalemate when major actors become reluctant to

218. Bogojević, supra note 69, at 355; Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23,
at 169.
219. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 179–82.
220. Oberthür & Kelly, supra note 26, at 36. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra
note 20, at 66; Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171, 182–84.
221. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 171; Oberthür & Kelly, supra
note 26, at 42–44.
222. Van Schaik & Schunz, supra note 23, at 182–84.
223. Stavros Afionis, The European Union as a negotiator in the international climate change regime, 11 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 341, 352–53
(2011).
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compromise their objectives.224 The uncertainty inherent in international negotiations is exacerbated by the unilateral actions of a single country when it is not clear if a self-interested
goal is at play. 225 However, the proponent of the unilateral
measure can alleviate this concern when the measure includes
some degree of sacrifice.226 Showing a “degree of sacrifice” in
climate negotiations has been problematic for the EU, as seen
with the Kyoto Protocol where the EU’s required GHG emissions reductions were less than one-third of the reductions that
would be required of the United States if it ratified the agreement.227
The shift in the political landscape of climate negotiations
since the Kyoto Protocol also helps to explain the EU’s struggle
to upload its norms to the global level. The United States and
the EU played a dominant role during the formation of the
UNFCCC, and the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, as the
countries responsible for the majority of CO2 emissions from
developed countries.228 However, by the fifteenth Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC in Copenhagen, the BASIC countries had joined the EU and the United States as major players
at the negotiating table.229 China, in particular, has become an
“indispensable actor in climate politics,” in that its CO2 emissions are expected to exceed the U.S.’s emissions by 75% by
2030.230 In contrast, the EU hopes to cut CO2 emissions by 40%
of 1990 levels by 2030.231 The shift of the political order in climate negotiations tends to erode the EU’s influence over the
process.

224. See Cinnamon Carlarne, The Glue that Binds or the Straw That Broke
the Camel’s Back?: Exploring the Implications of U.S. Reengagement in Global Climate Change Negotiations, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 148 (2010).
225. Afionis, supra note 223, at 349–50.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Lisanne Groen, et. al., The EU as a Global Leader? The Copenhagen
and Cancun UN Climate Change Negotiations, 8 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 173,
180 (2012).
229. Id.
230. Carlarne, supra note 224, at 123–24.
231. Commission Staff Working Paper on Analysis of options beyond 20%
GHG emission reductions: Member State results, 7 (2012) SWD 5 (Jan. 2,
2012),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/docs/swd_2012_5_en.pdf.

1188

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

Despite this, the EU still plays an important role in setting
the climate agenda.232 While the EU is not always successful in
delivering on its ambitious aspirations in climate change negotiations, it often gains a first-mover advantage by its ability to
use its norms to define the problem at issue and propose a solution.233 In addition, the EU has been successful as a “blocking
power” in preventing attempts to renegotiate established principles and goals in international negotiations.234 The EU is likely to continue to be a major player in international climate negotiations for several reasons. First, the EU retains a competitive advantage with its significant trading bloc of twenty-seven
member states.235 This significance is driven home by the EU’s
“trading and investment relationships” with the United States,
which consist of “nearly 40 percent of world trade.”236 Second,
the EU is seen as a balancing force in the future distribution of
power between multiple nations, such as China, Russia, and
the United States.237 And third, the EU is particularly suited to
continue structuring climate negotiations and advocate for international cooperation due to the strength of its own domestic
environmental policy.238
The debate over the EU Directive is already highly politicized, as indicated by the challenge to the Directive before the
European Court of Justice, and the U.S. legislation prohibiting
U.S. airlines from complying with the Directive. In addition,
the United States, India, China, and twenty other countries
adopted the Moscow Joint Declaration to urge the EU to cease
application of the Aviation Directive to non-EU aircraft operators and threatened future legal challenges before the ICAO
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and the WTO.239 If the resolution of the conflict over the Directive is transferred to the WTO, the Appellate Body will be
forced to decide on the balance between trade rights and
measures to address climate change, a decision upon which its
members have failed to come to an agreement.240
A judicial resolution of the dispute over the Directive would
create a lose-lose situation. If the WTO strikes down the Directive, it would receive severe disapproval from the EU and
environmental organizations that support the Directive. 241 In
addition, a ruling against the Directive would undermine the
EU’s role as a leader in climate policy, a role that has been crucial in driving international climate negotiations forward.242 If
the Appellate Body were to uphold the Directive, however, the
decision would be met with widespread opposition, undermining political support for the WTO as a trade institution and also undermining its legitimacy in balancing states’ interests.243
This may also instigate offended members to take action to exclude the EU from future efforts to reach a multilateral agreement.244 Both outcomes would serve as a major disruption in
the continuation and success of climate negotiations, with catastrophic consequences for the climate.245
CONCLUSION
Global climate change remains a formidable challenge, with
the window for action quickly closing.246 While an international
consensus has formed that global temperature increases must
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244. In the summer of 2012, the United States did not extend an invitation
to the EU for a meeting it hosted for non-EU nations and U.S. State and
Transportation Departments to discuss aviation emissions. Christopher F.
Schuetze, U.S. Fight Against E.U. Airline Emissions Plan Heats Up, INT’L
HERALD
TRIB.
1
(Aug.
6,
2012),
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/u-s-fight-against-europeanairline-emissions-plan-heats-up/.
245. PURVIS & GRAUSZ, supra note 17, at 3.
246. See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING
STONE (Jul. 29, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/globalwarmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719.

1190

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 38:3

be limited to 2° Celsius to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate,”247 there still remains a significant gap between countries’ voluntary commitments and the
reductions necessary to prevent global temperature increase
above this threshold.248 Even though the EU’s Directive constitutes a step toward addressing this environmental challenge, it
will ultimately serve as a setback in efforts to address global
climate change.
Enforcement of the Directive on non-EU airlines will exacerbate the already severe tensions surrounding the measure,
driving the dispute into the WTO for judicial resolution. Instead of creating positive environmental norms, the Directive’s
failure before the WTO would undermine the use of unilateral
environmental measures with extraterritorial effects as a tool
for climate policy, as well as other non-climate related environmental measures. Though the WTO has yet to use GATT
Article XX to balance international trade with efforts to combat
climate change, it is unwise to use the Directive as a means to
define this relationship. A multilateral environmental agreement for aviation emissions is on the horizon, and even if the
38th ICAO Assembly fails to establish a market-based mechanism for these emissions, the EU should abstain from the extra-territorial application of the measure to preserve the climate negotiation process.
Katelyn E. Ciolino
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